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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I analyze the effectiveness of community-based management (CBM),  as a
participatory governance system, for securing the access to fishery resources and coastal land
of small-scale indigenous communities, whose livelihoods have been previously threatened by
market-led and government-supported dispossessions, known as ocean grabbing. From CBM
experiences in Coron Island in the Philippines, Gili Indah in Indonesia and Patos Lagoon in Brazil, I
found that CBM is a powerful tool to put forward legislative pressure f o r  p l a c i n g  pro-
community norms and institutions  and, to create public awareness on environmental
degradation and fishermen marginalization. However, without the  support from government
authorities or NGOs, the lack of education and  competition  for  resources  among fishermen
prevent the creation of a comprehensive system for conflict resolution and community
administration over resources.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
 In fishery, it is generally recognized that Hardin’s Tragedy of the Common (1968) arises from
the lack of property rights in marine resources. During mid-20 th century, the impressive evolution of
fishery technologies allowed bigger catches in an open access condition of the oceans, although the
lack of a proper body of laws regulating the exploitation. Due to a centralized top-down approach in
fishery management, overcapacity has quickly caused the depletion of fish stocks, loss of biodiversity
and exclusion of small-scale fishermen from the policy-making (Pomeroy et al. 2007). Furthermore,
the Tragedy of the Commons is understood also as a community1 failure: in racing for resources,
coastal small-scale communities abandon social and moral norms of equality and reciprocity to seek
selfish profits, causing an overall socioeconomic impoverishment (Jentoft: 2000, Benè: 2003). 
However,  since  the  1970s,  marine  resource  restoration  has  become  an  imperative  in  the
international  scenario.  Conservationists  have promoted a new management  paradigm: “from sea
sharing to sea sparing” (Wolff: 2015), meaning the enclosure of important marine sites from any
harvesting activity in order to protect and restore biodiversity. At the same time, the growing global
demand for seafood has pressured the commercial fishery sector, which found in property rights a
profitable mean to allocate resources (Ibid). Moreover, the recreational and tourism industries, urban
infrastructures and industrial sites claimed for more coastal areas utilization. However, the voice of
small-scale  fishers  have  scarcely  been  taken  into  account,  decreasing  their  control  over  natural
resources and threatening their livelihoods (Franco et al: 2014). Low-quality governance in coastal
management policies, resulting in the worsening of human security and socio-economic wealth of
small-scale fishermen, is known as ‘ocean grabbing’. According to Bennet et al. (2015, p. 62):
Ocean grabbing refers to dispossession or appropriation of use, control or access to ocean space or
resources from prior resource users, rights holders or inhabitants. […] Ocean grabbing can be perpetrated by
public institutions or private interests.
A common denominator  in  ocean  grabbing  is  the  exclusion  of  small-scale  fisheries  from
resource and market access. The main mechanisms driving ocean grabbing are: loss of harvesting
rights due to changes in regulations, (i.e. The Right-Based Fishery, see Del Valle et al. 2006); non-
recognition of local customary laws which previously granted the physical access (i.e. centralization
regime in Indonesia under the New Order,  see Satria & Matsuda: 2004),  and finally  (even if  less
coercive) the pollution, destruction and depletion of the marine ecosystem (Franco et al:2014). 
1 In this paper, the term community refers to indigenous villages where economic activities such as fishery or
husbandry  absorb  the  majority  of  labor,  mainly  practiced  at  a  subsistence  level  and  only  partially  for
commercial networks.
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The need for a long-term sustainable management of fishery, as well as for the legitimization
of  indigenous  community  rights  and  knowledge,  led  to  the  formulation  of  new  approaches:
participatory governance is by far the most effective. It is constituted by a decentralized and cross-
levels structure, where collaboration and involvement among stakeholders induce mutual respect
between governors and governed, while its style is marked by a consensus-seeking negotiation (Gray:
2005).  In  particular,  as  a  form  of  participatory  governance,  Community-based  Management
(henceforth CBM) is considered an empowering tool for the establishment of local organizations and
enforcing  regulations.  It  improves  the  participation  of  small-scale  fishermen  in  policy-making,
bringing benefits and integration into the economic system. However, a bad implementation of CBM
can  lead  to  chaos  in  fishery  regulations,  illegal  activities  and  stratification  of  the  community
(Pomeroy: 1995; Pomeroy et al: 1997; Dey and Kanagaratnam: 2007). 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  analyze  the  efficacy  of  the  CBM  system  in  developing
countries, where yields maximization and centralized management has generally persisted since the
1950s (see Andrew et al 2007). Through a multiple case study, the research answers the question: to
what extent is CBM effective in preserving resource access to small-scale fishermen in coastal areas
affected  by  ocean  grabbing  phenomena? The  analyzed  experience  are  small-scale  fishermen
communities in  Coron Island (Philippines),  Gili  Indah (Northwest  Lombok,  Indonesia),  and in  the
estuary of Patos Lagoon (Southern Brazil). By deconstructing each case, I find CBM to be a meaningful
tool for increasing political inclusion of fishers through the formation of representative organizations
and unions. While on one side education and communities commitment in collaborating with NGOs
or  academic  bodies  are  extremely  helpful  during  CBM  implementation,  on  the  other  side,  I
demonstrate  the  primary  importance  of  government  proactivity  for  conflict  resolution  and  law
enforcement, without which CBM is doomed to remain just a nice concept. 
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CHAPTER 2
COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT INSTITUTION
2.1 Community-based Fisheries Management for reducing ocean grabbing and securing community 
access.
As  I  introduced  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  aim for  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the
resource has developed many initiatives. However, sometimes these alternatives have undervalued
the impacts on site-located indigenous communities, causing dispossession of land and resources. In
fact, ocean grabbing occurs through 
fisheries governance, trade and investment policies, […] no-take conservation areas, ecotourism and 
energy policies, financial speculations and the expanding operations in the global food and fish industry, 
including large-scale aquaculture […] (Franco et al:2014, 4).
Key drivers of ocean grabbing are financial investment for recreational use of coastal and
marine areas, establishment of Marine Protected Areas (as no-take enclosures), and efficiency of the
food supply chain, which prioritizes the privatization of fish stocks or land through the allocation of
property  rights  (Franco  et  al:  2014;  Wolff:2015).  However,  although  environmental  degradation
justifies the restrictions on local resources (Benjaminsen & Bryceson:2012), it is relevant to notice
that the literature has not confirmed a positive correlation between privatization of fisheries and
resource restoration (Carothers & Chambers: 2017). Another factor is the openness of resource-rich
countries (i.e. Southeast Asian countries) to foreign capitals and to foreign concepts of environmental
management,  in  many cases  leading to a re-allocation of  common property to private actors  by
government policies (Doerr:2016).
 In opposition to the predatory allocation of resources, policy-makers looked for the adoption
of  a different  management  system as  a meso level  governance including the direct  users  of  the
resources.  The  term  Community-based  Management  of  Natural  Resources  (henceforth  CBNRM)
defines a type of governance of common pool resources. It has been re-considered as an alternative
to  the  unsuccessful  state-driven  and  market-led  approach  in  natural  resource  management
(Armitage: 2005, Jentoft et al:1998). The central idea is that 
communities,  defined by their  tight spatial  boundaries of  jurisdiction and responsibilities,  by their
distinct  and  integrated  social  structure  and  common  interests,  can  manage  their  natural  resources  in  an
efficient, equitable, and sustainable way (Blaikie: 2006).
 CBNRM involves the maintenance of wildlife, fisheries, forestry and coastal areas. It has a
pro-poor and food security approach, it promotes the implementation of indigenous knowledge for
the efficient and sustainable use  of the common resource, it resolves conflicts over open access and
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bad  allocation  of  property  rights,  and  lastly,  it  empowers  the  community  through  an  active
participation in policy-making (Ibid). The fundamental principles regulating CBNRM are well defined
territorial boundaries; limitation of harvesting practices; collective choice agreements; monitoring;
graduated  sanctions;  conflict  resolution  mechanisms;  minimum  recognition  of  rights;  nested
enterprises (Cox et al.:2010). Such institutions have already demonstrated to work efficiently when it
comes to fisheries management both in developed countries2,  and in countries with a centenary
tradition of small-scale fishery3. 
Connecting sustainability and empowerment of small-scale communities has been observed
through  the  implementation  of  the  above  described  participatory  governance,  which  category
includes  the  Community-based  Management  of  fisheries  (CBM).  This  is  an  informal-based,
decentralized  and  collective  decision-making  institution,  re-including  small  stakeholders  in  the
management process, in an equal dialogue that allows the collaboration among civil society, market
and government structures. The two pillars for the success of this participatory governance system
are legitimacy of stakeholders through their involvement in decision-making, and consensus-seeking
negotiation (Gray:2005; Pomeroy:2011).
Finally, the application of CBM for fisheries is  a powerful  tool since, working on different
levels, it secures the community access to the resource by:
 empowering local communities to exercise control over resources and institutions on which
they depend; 
 regulating economic opportunities on the principle of equity (fair access to fishers and group
members who respect harvesting regulation); 
 empowering  local  communities  through  the  implementation  of  the  customary  law  and
traditional indigenous knowledge; 
 promoting the inclusion of other community members other than fishermen: women, youth,
and coastal workers are equal stakeholders in the sustainable use of resources (Graham et al:
2006).
2.2 Profile of the cases.
2.2.1. The ancestral domain of Tagbanwa community in Coron Island, Palawan, Philippines.  
2 Japan and Canada are two brilliant examples of how CBM can collaborate with the commercial sector for an
efficient use of the resources (see respectively Yamamoto:1995, Capistrano & Charles: 2012).
3 Micronesia and Philippines represent two successful cases of CBM restoration after a centralized management
of fisheries (see respectively Johannes:2002 and Pomerory et al: 1997).
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Coron Island (Fig. 1) is a part of the Calamianes Island Group located in northern Palawan
province, considered the last ecological frontier of the country. In its total land area of 7700 ha, Coron
Island hosts multiple ecosystems such as mangroves, tropical forests, coral reefs, lakes and lagoons,
with a variety of marine and wildlife species (Sampang: 2007) . 
Figure 1. Map of ancestral domain of the Calamian Tagbanwas showing traditional fishing
grounds. Source: Sampang, 2007, p. 21
The  municipality  of  Coron  is  the  homeland  of  the  ethnic  group  Calamian  Tagbanwa  (or
Tagbanua): they are described as having a semi-nomadic lifestyle, depending on sea resources, or on
shift cultivation in the near riverbanks and valleys. Data from the municipality show that the most
common occupations are fishery,  agriculture,  community and social  services.  The majority of  the
households fishes for subsistence, while just a few families are engaged in small-scale commercial
trade of fishery products (Sampang: 2007). The indigenous autonomous ability to manage coastal
resources was first threatened during the Spanish occupation, when the introduction of the Regalian
Doctrine dictated that all  lands of  public  domain belong to the State,  unless they were officially
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recognized to be private property. Converting the native land, this legal procedure dispossessed the
indigenous population of their own traditionally possessed land. Later, it was reinforced by the Maura
Law in 1894, which required all landowners to proof their property through a tax payment. If this was
not possible, the land would be reverted to the government. However, it was only during the 1970s
that  the government  acted a  coercive  sequester  of  many clan-caves,  due to the inability  of  the
Tagbanwa  to  afford  the  annual  tax;  lands  were  auctioned  off to  tourist  resorts  or  developers.
Furthermore, in the mid-80s, Tagbanwas were threatened by migrants from the neighbor provinces
such  as  the  Visayas,  who  occupied  their  area,  aggravating  the  declining  fish  catches  due  to
unregulated fishing activities (Capistrano & Charles: 2012; Sampang:2007; Capistrano: 2010). Finally,
from the early 1990s, touristic sector and developers started to pressure Tagbanwas to leave their
island (Fabinyi: 2010).
The  Tagbanwa's  belief  in  the  spirits  dwelled  in  nature  has  prevented  the  uncontrolled
exploitation  of  the  resource;  they  have  elaborated  specific  sacred  and  conservation  areas,  fish
sanctuaries, and food taboos. Fishing-related activities involve the rest of the community: women
and children take care of reef gleaning, crabs, sea urchins, sea shells, and seaweed collection. The
absence of electricity in the island and the share culture of catches have prevented the community
from  social  stratification  or  economic  development  of  the  small  fishing  sector.  Despite  the
subsistence  condition,  the  Tagbanwas  were  able  to  resist  the  Spanish  and  American  colonial
structures and the influence of migrant Filipino culture (Sampang: 2007).
3.2.2. Customary law Awig-awig in Gili Indah, West Lombok, Indonesia. 
Gili  Indah refers to insular villages in the northwest of Lombok, composed of three small
islands: Gili Air, Gili Meno and Gili Trawangan (Fig. 2). These are under the jurisdiction of the West
Lombok Regency (Kabupaten Lombok Barat), in the province of Nusa Tenggara Barat. Gili Indah are
surrounded by coral reefs, reef fish and seaweed (Satria et al: 2006). 
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Figure 2. Map of the trio Gili Indah, West Lombok. Source: Satria & Adhuri (2010)
With  a  population  of  roughly  3000  people,  the  most  common  local  occupations  are
husbandry and small-scale fishery, with many holding both activities. Touristic flows began in the late
1970s  and  1980s,  with  scuba  diving  and  snorkeling  activities,  to  which  local  people  responded
developing small-scale marine tourism facilities. This caused vertical mobility and stratification of the
community  since  the  elite  fishers  were  attracted  by  the  opportunity  of  becoming  tourism
entrepreneurs. Tourism gave also a new importance to the coral reef conservation, limiting harvesting
sites and techniques. The reduction of fishery grounds is not the only problem that has been affecting
the livelihoods of small-scale fishermen: indeed, the prevalent issue has been the deterioration of the
coral reef. Some of the causes are destructive fishing practices (in particular the muroami-netting 4),
the anchoring of tourist boats, coral mining, snorkeling and diving (Satria et al: 2004, Satria et al.:
2006).  Many  different  stakeholders  causes  conflicts  over  an  equal  management  of  the  common
resource: on one side, the main interest of fishers is to be able to practice traditional fishery (even if it
endangers  the  coral  reef),  while,  on  the  other  side,  tourist  entrepreneurs  (henceforth  TEs)  are
interested in conserving the coral reef (Satria et al: 2004).  The two parts found a first agreement
expressed in the customary law called Awig-Awig, formally signed by both groups of stakeholders in
1998-1999. 
4 Fishing technique using an encircling net with pounding devices. The pounding devices are lowered into the
areas, smashing the coral into small fragments in order to scare fishes out of their coral refuges, with obvious
destructive effects. Introduced by the Japanese during the occupation, the practice widely spreaded.
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Two different  ethnicities  are  present  in  the islands:  three-quarters  of  the population are
Buginese, originally from South Sulawesi, while the Sasak are native to the islands but previously
inhabiting the mainland of Lombok (Satria et al: 2006; Satria et al: 2004). Due to the relatively late
settlement  of  the Gili  Indah region,  it  has  been observed that  the customary  rules  for  resource
management (called Awig-Awig) are less rooted than in other areas, such as North Lombok. Awig-
Awig works primarily on boundaries definition and allocation of each area to a specific economic
group. It  defines also the authorities in charge of  monitoring and sanctioning, coordinating close
villages (Satria & Adhuri: 2010).
2.2.3. Commercial depletion of fish stocks in Patos Lagoon estuary, Southern Brazil.  
Small-scale  fishery  communities  have  existed  in  Patos  Lagoon  since  the  end  of  the  19 th
century. With its 300 km of length and 40 km in width, Patos Lagoon in Southern Brazil is considered
one of the biggest choked lagoons in the word (Fig. 3). The coastal plain, which delimits the lacustrine
area, is constituted by a wide sand strip of almost 40.000 km2, site of an important biodiversity
among  temperate  climates.  Then,  it  surrounds  two  remarkable  Conservation  Areas,  the  Taim
Ecological  Reserve  and  Lagoa  do  Peixe  National  Park,  both  included  in  the  UNESCO  Biosphere
Reserves Network (Kalikoski et al:2002; Tagliani et al:2003).
Figure 3. Patos Lagoon estuary, Southern Brazil. Source: Kalikoski et al (2002)
For  more  than  a  century  small-scale  fishermen  in  the  estuarine  region  caught  mainly
crustacean  and  teleosts,  and  more  in  general,  they  provided  fish  and  shellfish  products  to  be
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exported to the main Brazilian markets in the north or to other countries such as Uruguay. Data
confirms that artisanal fishery in the estuary of Patos Lagoon prospered up to the early 1980s, with a
sharp decline in fish stocks in the following years. It accounted for over 80% of the total catches in
Southern Brazil in 1966. It involved about 5000 fishermen in the 1990s, while at the beginning of the
21st century this number was reduced to 3500. Until the beginning of industrial exploitation of the
common resource,  the  small-scale  fishery  was  a  quite  productive  economic  activity  (Kalikoski  et
al:2002,  D'Incao  & Reis:2002).  In  general,  the  history  of  Patos  Lagoon  and  the  Brazilian  coastal
management  has  seen  the  depletion  of  the  resources  led  by  state  incentives,  through  the
improvement of commercial fishery and absence of property rights. Industrial fishery vessels started
to sail the estuary grounds during the 1950s. Loose regulations on resource extraction by the Federal
Fisheries Agency and the increasing prices for seafood (especially shrimps) caused overcapacity and
an unregulated access. In a second moment, fishing was further limited by the prioritization of port
and navigation activities on land utilization. Then, in order to protect the resource, the Environmental
Agency for fisheries management (IBAMA) prohibited the fishing of important species inside 3-miles
zone from the coast.  In  response to this  initiatives,  small-scale fishermen have tried to intensify
coastal fishing, disrupting the fishing calendars and further depleting the resource (Reis &D’Incao:
2000).
Regarding the pre-existing traditional methods of fisheries management, the communities
had secured their access to the resource through the definition of fishing territories, periods and
technologies based on micro-environment or on informal and formal rules. These are formed through
experience  and  represented  durable  and  legitimated  methods  to  control  space  and  resources
(Kalikoski et al: 2002; Reis & D'Incao:2000).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Methods 
I  investigate  the  level  of  effectiveness  of  CBM  of  fisheries  in  small-scale  indigenous
communities in developing countries through case studies. In general, the entire project has been
structured through 6 main steps as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Steps of the research project. Source: Tu, V. S. (2007)
I  think  that  multiple  case  studies  are  the  best  way  to  analyze  the  effectiveness  of  the  general
framework  here  referred  as  CBM  into  the  three  selected  experiences.  Since  the  customized
application of CBM model depends on cultural and socioeconomic conditions in these countries, the
results differ in quality of governance. The unit of analysis is not only restricted to the application of
the CBM project, but it is extended to the previous management of fishery and to the consequences
on coastal  resources  sustainability  and livelihood of  the  indigenous communities.  I  made use  of
available  reports  with  qualitative  and  quantitative  data  from  the  secondary  literature,  collected
through  literature  research  in  the  main  online  databases  (Google  Scholar,  Leiden  University
Catalogue). 
3.1.1 Determinants of CBM success
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A successful implementation of participatory governance requires the presence or creation of
a supporting legal  frame, the presence of  a homogeneous community,  the use of the traditional
indigenous knowledge (ITK) and community pro-activity in participating at the negotiation activities.
Specifically:
 Supporting legal frame.   A legal framework is referred as "a broad system of rules that governs
and  regulates  decision  making,  agreements,  laws"  (The  Translegal  Dictionary).  In  this
research, it is considered as the body of laws already existing or created on purpose for the
decentralization of resource management on behalf of the community. It is intended also as
norms regulating the access or delimiting the common property of the small-scale fishermen.
Jurisdiction over property rights, decision-making power, local responsibility and authorities,
rules enforcement and accountability formalize the fishers legitimacy over resources. A clear
definition of roles and rights helps in resolving arisen conflicts between stakeholders and
external  actors.  Without  legal  rights,  users  cannot  enforce  the  local  management  rules
(Pomeroy: 2011). The planning of regulations come both from central and local authorities
inputs, as well as from civil society pressures (Pollnac et al: 2001). In particular, the role of
government is crucial for conflict resolution: the recognition of the CBM legitimacy provides
the  fishers  with  a  fundamental  tool  valid  also  at  a  supra-community  level  (Pomeroy  et
al:2001). 
 Presence of a homogeneous community.   A community is intended as a 
     social group possessing shared beliefs, a stable membership, the expectation of continuing 
interaction and a pattern of relations that are direct and multiplex (Young:1995, in Jentoft: 2000, p 58).
Fishers  communities  usually  share  kinship  system,  ethnicity,  religion  and  fishing  gear
tradition;  the  historical  and  cultural  evolution  of  those  communities  are  bound  to  that
geographical  site where economic activities take place.  Especially  for fisher groups, being
locally-bound is particularly important in the process of reclaiming the traditional grounds,
maybe the first and most important step in a CBM project. Then, cultural and socioeconomic
homogeneity  has  been  already  observed  as  a  factor  improving  participatory  governance
(Pollnac et al: 2001).  In fact,  when occupation and cultural characteristic are shared, it  is
easier  to  reach a  consensus,  to  cooperate  with  external  agencies,  to  legitimize  the  local
leader as the driver of the group (Ibid). Successful management cases of small-scale fisheries
in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia have seen a high level of socioeconomic and cultural
homogeneity (Pomeroy et al: 2001).
 ITK implementation.   One of the most used definitions of ITK is: 
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                a cumulative body of knowledge and beliefs, handed down through generations by cultural 
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with 
their environment (Berkes: 1993, in Mulrennan:2013, p. 92). 
ITK  belongs  to  the  entire  community  and  connects  cultural  values,  customary  laws  with
spiritual beliefs. ITK can be compatible with western science: its formation depends on the
accumulation of observations about ecological changes and on an adaptive approach. ITK
contributes to the biodiversity conservation through the recognition of endangered species
or sacred areas for fish reproduction. Therefore, it is already a reality that the collaboration
between  the  two  methods  of  knowledge  leads  to  the  improvement  of  management
initiatives (Deepananda et al: 2015). Indigenous knowledge regulates the fishery practices by
signalizing  temporary  restriction;  exploiting resources  in  a  flexible  and rotational  pattern,
depending on the ecological  feedback;  securing  the enforcement of  rules  based on local
knowledge. It is opposed to the quantitative method of commercial fisheries since it works
with ecosystem feedbacks and it is not directed to reach a yield target (Berkes et al:2000). 
 Community pro-activity.   It means the ability of the users (fishermen and marine resources
related workers) to speak with one voice, to gain a position that is relevant to the discussion
of fishery policies. In fact, the more users are able to gather and to cooperate in an institution
such as a fishery association, the more difficult is for the government to ignore their requests
(Jentoft &  McCay:  1996).  Empowerment  of  the  community  comes  from  the  individual
commitment to balance internal power relations inside the community. In a second moment
then, communities want to gain more autonomy and recognition from higher institutions. In
most  cases,  there  is  a  lack  of  tools  for  self-empowerment,  due  to  extreme  poverty,
socioeconomic constraints, and geographical remoteness (Pomeroy et al:2001). Community
pro-activity is  demonstrated also in the commitment to collaborate with external  agents,
such as NGOs, academic or scientific research institutions, and so on. The positive results
from this cooperation are community access to information, direct users participation, and
the development of self-initiatives (Ibid).
3.1.2 Effectiveness Measurement 
I apply three conditions as evidence for assessing the general level of CBM effectiveness: 
 Reversal  in  regulation  toward  small-scale  fishermen  interests.   In  other  words,  has  CBM
secured  a  reversal  of  policies  towards  the  legal  recognition  of  fishermen  property  and
management rights over coastal resources? Examples of regulations supporting small-scale
fishermen are: indigenous rights over the ancestral domain, common property rights limited
to the community members, democratic and collective consensus as a decision-making tool,
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and free prior consent of local community before any developmental project or changing in
resource management. Such laws have to be aligned with property rights norms and fishery
policies contents at all jurisdictional levels. In opposition, discrepancies with the contents of
existing  laws  cause  the  weakening  of  the  community  legitimacy,  decreasing  the  level  of
empowerment.
 Empowerment of users through the establishment of local fishery organizations.   If property
laws secure the exclusive allocation of the resources, the formation of fishery organizations
represents probably the most important mean to include small-scale users in the political
process of management. Fishery groups collect their strength from the commitment of each
individual  member  in  participating,  getting  informed,  and  collaborating  with  external
associations. Improving their importance in the decision-making process, they secure that the
communities’ priorities are addressed in the implementation of new policies; 
 Creation  of  effective  measures  for  the  resolution  of  conflicts.   The  three  cases  portrait
different types of dispossession, which concern conflicts for coastal resources, land property
rights, and illegal activities. However, with the application of the participatory governance
model, small-scale fishermen are supposed to gain both the political power to establish and
enforce their own rules and to accept the involvement of the government as a mediator for
enforcement. Since conflicts over a common property are far from being easily manageable,
a successful CBM must consider the creation of resolving institutions, in order to protect and
renovate the sovereignty of the community. 
For each case study, I give a score from 1 (=Very Weak) to 5 (=Very Strong), depending on the level of
improvement in the above three conditions after the application of CBM (Table 1). 
1 2 3 4 5
Very Weak Weak Modest Strong Very Strong
 Table 1. Efficacy score rank.
This method allows me to easily identify the level of success for each CBM case study. In conclusion:
• The higher the score is, the better the CBM has tackled issues deriving from ocean grabbing
practices. Indeed, high scores mean that the four success determinants of CBM, which I used
to deconstruct each case, have really represented fundamental conditions to decrease the
negative consequences of ocean grabbing. Therefore, CBM is effective in securing fishers’
rights and autonomy to manage coastal resources. 
• On the contrary, low scores mean two things: first, that for that particular CBM experience
the  same  factors  do  not  correspond  to  a  similar  improvement  of  fishers  community
livelihood. Secondly, that the CBM has not been able to strengthen all or some of the four
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conditions,  due  to  continuing  or  rising  conflicts  with  extra-community  actors.  The  latter
hyphotesis lead to the conclusion that, in that specific case, CBM is not preserving fishers’
access to coastal resources, and that a different approach (such as co-management) could
bring better results.
3.2 Cases selection and data collection 
In selecting the case studies, I applied the following criteria:
- The case has to be located in a small-scale fishermen community in a developing country; 
- The case has to concern the development of a CBM model on coastal and fishery resources;
- The community involved has faced a condition of dispossession of coastal areas and fishery
resources access, caused by government policies or by powerful stakeholders’ (both fishery
industry and touristic sector) interests,  prior to the application of CBM; 
- The case has to involve recognized threats to the livelihood of  the small-scale fishermen
indigenous community involved into the CBM project, in terms of food security and economic
activities.
If  taken together,  the case studies in Coron Island (Philippines),  Gili  Indah (Indonesia),  and Patos
Lagoon (Brazil) are comparable for a number of reasons:
 The trends in fisheries management can be comparable: the three cases show the gradual
passage  from a  centralized  system to  some forms  of  decentralization.  All  of  them show
concerns  about  environmental  degradation  and  decreasing  of  fish  stocks.  Both  due  to
government initiatives or pressures from the excluded communities, the need for long-term
sustainability of the resource led to a gradual reversal of regulation. 
 In  all  the  geographical  sites  taken  into  account,  pro-market  regulations  have  led  to  the
marginalization  of  small-scale  fishermen and  to  unresolved  conflicts  over  resources.  The
indigenous communities are damaged by some dispossession practices, although at different
levels. It is possible to summarize them into conflicts over land and resources with tourism
sector (even backed by government authorities), conflicts over resources with the industrial
and commercial fishery, and conflicts with external users (migrants), and fishers belonging to
the community (disapproval of fisheries rules).
 As developing countries, they show a severe lack of infrastructure, lack of law enforcement,
and different levels of conflicts at provincial, regional or national levels. The enforcement and
conflict resolution system can be worsened by corruption and political networks between
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governmental and commercial fisheries elite. Both the two Southeast Asian countries and
Brazil are well-known for high levels of corruption and social inequality. 
 The involved communities represented one of the poorest section of the society: common
features  are  lack  of  information,  subsistence  economy,  and  geographic  remoteness.
Moreover, the traditional fishing methods and gears do not allow the community to gain a
large  surplus  for  diversification  towards  small  entrepreneurship  initiatives  such  as  small
commercial  fisheries.  Without supporting rights over resources,  the subsistence condition
perpetrates the severe unbalance of the community in terms of resource accessibility with
the large-scale sector.
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 CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Research Findings
4.1.1 Executive findings
Overall,  I  found  CBM  to  be  an  effective  management  model  for  reducing  ocean  grabbing
dispossession of land and resources, for two main arguments. These are:
• CBM has  demonstrated  to  improve  local  awareness  and  information about  fisheries  and
ecosystem management. This is visible in the inclusion of the whole community in a new
dialogue on indigenous authority over coastal areas, as well as in the reevaluation of local
knowledge. 
• Under the development of the CBM model, community members are empowered by learning
how they can pressure  the central  government in  order  to  gain  alternative management
systems. 
Regarding the preservation of fishers’  access, the case of CBM in Coron Island, which has
worked successfully in each of the four determinants, has given the best results. Here, the small-scale
fishers gained an almost total autonomy on resource access, even if the threat of conflicts with other
sectors is not entirely resolved. On the other side, the CBM implemented in Gili  Indah and Patos
Lagoon  did  not  preserve  fishers  rights  in  a  similar  way.  In  the  two  cases,  CBM  institutions  are
weakened by rising conflicts and by the negligible support by higher authorities. The latter situation
occurs: when the central or municipal governments are interested in a different development of the
region; when the community lacks sustainment in law enforcement against illegal activities or other
conflicts (industrial fishing, migration flow). In conclusion, in presence of such obstacles CBM, should
be anticipated by intermediate types of participatory governance, which could perform better.
4.1.2 Reversal in regulation towards small-scale fishermen community
Coron Island (PH) Gili Indah (IN) Patos Lagoon (BR)
Pro-community reversal
of regulation
4 3 2
Table 2. Final score for pro-community reversal in regulation.
As observed, the creation of pro-community regulations follows a gradual pattern depending
on the accountability of local organizations. The passage from centralized to decentralized fisheries
management has been both supported and undermined at the same time by governmental agencies.
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The support comes from the necessity for a new management paradigm due to the overexploitation
of resources, while the slow decentralization is due to both a lack of trust in the community’s abilities
or to arising conflicts (i.e. with tourism). I found that in the case of Coron Island, CBM has effectively
empowered the community,  who pushed the local  government for the recognition of indigenous
rights over coastal resources. Indeed, besides the constitutional definition of indigenous territory
rights, as site-bounded communities, they became officially in charge of managing, exploiting and
using the claimed areas.  Furthermore, their consensus is required before the implementation of any
external  action involving  the  Tagbanwa domain.  For  these  reasons,  I  gave  them the  score  of  4,
meaning a strong level of pro-community regulations guaranteed by the CBM model. On the opposite
side, I gave the score of 2 to the fishermen of Patos Lagoon. Although the Forum of Patos Lagoon 5
promoted the first steps towards the empowerment of local communities, the government has not
responded  with  regulations  addressing  their  main  concerns.  The  new  rules  represented  a  good
starting point, as they created awareness and law enforcement inside the communities, determining
the practices and boundaries of artisanal fishery. However, the main conflict with industrial fishery
has not been addressed by any governmental prescription. For what concerns the CBM of coral reef
in Gili Indah, the situation is a little bit more complicated. The establishment of Awig-Awig induced a
reversal of regulation towards indigenous communities (i.e. delimitation of specific area ruled as a
common property), supported by the decentralization act for local autonomy. However, due to the
growing importance of the TEs group decision-making power, the voice of small-scale fishermen has
been  overpassed.  Moreover,  the  governmental  initiative  of  developing  Gili  Indah  as  a  touristic
conservation  park,  as  well  as  critiques  against  the  muroami-netting,  are  in  contrast  with  the
improvement of small-scale fishers’ livelihoods. Since the mentioned conflicts have been resolved
only  partially,  due  to  continuous  pressure  by  the  tourism  sector,  the  pro-fishermen  regulation
adopted with CBM lacks efficiency. To Awig-awig of Gili Indah, I gave the score of 3. 
4.1.2 Empowerment of users through the establishment of local fishery organizations
Coron Island (PH) Gili Indah (IN) Patos Lagoon (BR)
Community
empowerment through
fishery organizations
5 2 2
Table 3. Final score for community empowerment through fishery organization.
5 Organization funded in 1996 with the support of IBAMA governmental agency for improving the management
of regional small-scale fisheries in the region through a community-based model (Reis & D’Incao: 2000).
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In all the three case studies, CBM implementation is accompanied by training and workshops
offered  by  academic  or  research  institutions.  They are  preceded by  preliminary  meetings  at  the
village level to collect information about the real needs of the community to form a good action
strategy.  However,  CBM becomes  effective  in  a  long-term perspective  only  when able  to  create
durable organizations managed in first place by local fishers, who replace the external agents such as
NGOs at the leadership of the established association (Afifi: 2011). I found out that CBM does not
work efficiently when the purpose of fisheries organizations is not internalized by the community. The
CBM  of  Coron  Island  again  represents  the  best  case  of  community  empowerment  through  the
complexity of its representation organisms. Since the formation of the Tagbanua Foundation and later
the Saragpunta Federation6, the indigenous people have been able to reorganize their structure in
order  to  carry  on an equal  dialogue with  the concerning  authorities.  The facts  of  gathering  the
communities into one instrument adapted to the existing legal frame legitimized their pressures for
rights. Moreover, is the community itself who elects the outspoken leader of the Foundation: even
prior to the CBM, the executive role of the leader was already part of the traditional structure of the
village. The authority that this figure exercises helped the community members to accept the various
changes.  Indeed, participation is  said to be the most important successful  feature pervading the
Tagbanuas’  struggle  (Mayo-Anda  et  al:  2006).  This  CBM  shows  a  strong  self-organization  and
management power; a bottom-up pressure for rights approval; a community-based monitoring and
managing of the activities occurring inside the domain (fishing, tourism visits). On the other side,
Awig-Awig of  Gili  Indah shows a complicated process of  promotion and internalization of  fishery
organizations in the village structure. The fact could be unexpected since the historical compatibility
of the customary law with the cultural system. However, the perception that Awig-Awig is more pro-
tourism interests than fishermen livelihood caused less legitimacy of law enforcement among them.
Tourism Entrepreneurs (TEs) took the lead for monitoring activities, providing funds and transport
means,  and including the local  authorities  such as the police,  instead of  relying on community’s
members.  Therefore,  the  strength  of  indigenous  organizations  is  negligible  due  to  fishers’
marginalization in coral reef management. This is demonstrated by the fact that they are generally
represented by LMNLU (Fishers Council of Northern Lombok), whose scope comprehends the whole
region of North Lombok. In other words, the initial high level of participation and enthusiasm towards
the external collaboration was not corresponded by an appropriate changing in institutions on behalf
of the community. For what concerns Patos Lagoon, the foundation of fisheries groups or Colonies
was promoted by the federal government since the 1950s (Kalikoski et al: 2010). However, prior to
the Forum, the Colonies were a mere bureaucratic mean for filtering the instructions coming from the
6 Two community organizations promoters of the dialogue on indigenous rights. The Federation comprehends  
seven Calamian Tagbanua associations from Coron Island villages (Mayo-Anda et al: 2006).
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central government to fishers (Ibid). Even after the application of the participatory governance, the
voice of fishermen organizations is still weak. This is due to the unfamiliarity of fishermen with the
new developmental model, and to a history of marginalization affecting the community commitment
towards  changes.  In  fact,  although  a  good  level  of  community  involvement  into  activities  and
researches proposed by the Forum, small-scale fishers in Patos Lagoon do not feel law enforcement
as their own responsibility. Moreover, the loose regulations for resource use by the industrial vessels
and the lack of a conflict resolution mechanism perpetrate the weak status of the community. 
4.1.3 Creation of effective measures or political organisms for the resolution of conflicts.
Coron Island (PH) Gili Indah (IN) Patos Lagoon (BR)
Mechanism for the
resolution of conflicts 
4 3 1
Table 4. Final score for conflicts resolution.
In none of the considered cases, I found an impartial method of conflicts resolution between
the indigenous community and external actors, such as other economic sectors and the government.
The  attractiveness  of  the  natural  heritage  of  Coron  Island  and  Gili  Indah  for  tourism  or  the
commercial  profitability  of  Patos Lagoon biodiversity make these territories  extremely contested.
According  to  the  analysis,  more  than  once  the  direct  government  itself  has  interfered  with  the
decentralization process through new local or national policies. Therefore, its role as a mediator loses
legitimacy  in  communities’  eyes.  Then,  even  inside  each  community,  the  traditional  hierarchical
structure cannot always guarantee the resolution of disputes originated among users.  One of the
reasons is the lack of internalization of the new CBM structures inside the community society. Indeed,
when fishers do not perceive themselves as the direct beneficiaries of the CBM, they justify their
non-compliance with the established law. Starting with the least scored case, the Forum of Patos
Lagoon has created a partial framework for the regulation of artisanal fishery. However, this set of
regulations does not comprehend limitations also for the industrial sector, whose activities reach the
same exploited areas. Moreover, until the national constitution guarantees the open access condition
of fisheries, the local ownership of resources will always be contested. In the first place, outsiders,
who traditionally have drawn resources from the common pool, reclaim their extraction rights. The
governmental  agencies  manage the situation inefficiently,  since the low human resources  in  law
enforcement (Kalikoski et al: 2002). Therefore, it fails to act as a peacemaker in the case of conflicts.
For what concerns  the CBM of  coral  reef  in Gili  Indah, I  found that a partial  resolution of  infra-
community conflicts was achieved. Indeed, a compensation system was established for sanctioning
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each violation (Satria et al:2006). The release of the new Awig-Awig in 2003 confirmed the creation of
an  alternative  method  for  regulating  disputes  concerning  allowed  or  prohibited  fishing  zones.
However,  two supra-community conflicts still  occur:  the central government and the municipality
compete  for  the  management  authority  over  Gili  Indah,  while  the  environmental  and  fisheries
agencies compete for the total prohibition or allowance of muroami-netting (Satria et al: 2004). For
these reasons, I gave the score of 3 to the CBM of Gili Indah. The Tagbanuas, on the other side, have
secured the least possibility of conflict over resources, but they are not immune from it. Although the
community is provided with the legal means to avoid conflicts on the ancestral domain (such as the
free prior informed consent), external pressures from developers backed by the local government are
getting stronger. Coron Island and the surroundings are destinations of new touristic facilities and
financial aids for coastal land development, while internal resources, such as forestry, are in the sights
of mining and pulpwood sectors. The biggest threat could come from the municipal authority itself,
which seems extremely enthusiast about the tourism alternative. In conclusion, the three cases are
not supported by an effective strategy to tackle emerging conflicts yet. 
4.2 Determinants of CBM success
For each factor, I provided a short section concerning the findings before the in-depth 
analysis. 
4.2.1 Supporting legal frame
Among the three cases, I found the CBM of Coron Island in the Philippines to be the best
legitimized participatory governance by current laws. Here, the state provided a reinforcement of
property  rights  of  indigenous  people  on  ancestral  domains,  while  the  evolution  of  fisheries
management towards CBM was pushed both by decentralization policies and pressure from the civil
society. The CBM of Coron Island is supported by the most comprehensive legal framework, while the
other two cases have some constraints on their property rights. Gili Indah CBM ability to preserve
fishers’  access  rights  over  fishing  grounds  is  hindered  by  a  multi-level  conflict.  First,  between
fishermen and tourist business over resources, and then between local and central government on
fisheries management authority. This situation has led to the weakening of Awig-Awig, the customary
law  governing  Gili  Indah.  Finally,  the  fishermen  communities  in  Patos  Lagoon  are  struggling  for
stronger regulations over resources allocation through a partial  representation in the Forum. The
commitment of the central government to decentralize fisheries management is unclear. The efforts
of the Forum of Patos Lagoon in empowering local communities are held back by the ongoing formal
open access of fisheries. 
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The creation of a legal  framework to legitimize the management rights of the indigenous
communities in some cases benefits from the compatibility with some of the existent policies, such as
in the CBM of Coron Island and Gili Indah. However, this is not the case of Patos Lagoon, where the
Brazilian  constitution  still  recognizes  the  open  access  condition  for  fisheries  management.  In
particular,  the  Tagbanua  of  Coron  Island  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  already  existent
framework supporting the indigenous property,  which is  not  found in the other  cases.  First,  the
National Philippine Constitution of 1987 mentioned the grant of indigenous people’s rights on the
traditional  domain.  Later,  two  political  organisms  were  created  to  ensure  the  participation  of
indigenous communities in resource management: the National Integrated Protected Area System
(NIPAS) and the Environmental Critical Areas Networks (ECAN). Both of them work for the recognition
of  tribal  ancestral  areas  and  for  the  inclusion  of  community  members  into  the  decision-making
(Capistrano: 2010, Dalabajan: 2001). After the seizure of coastal areas and caves by the municipality
in the 1970s, the declaration of Coron Island as a Natural Reserve in 1967 stated the government
interest in developing the island as a tourist area and a marine reserve. However, the Tagbanua were
able  to  temporarily  regain  the  property  of  the  surrounding  forests  and  caves  applying  for  the
Community Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA) at the governmental Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), in 1985. In order to do so, they gathered in the Tagbanua Foundation
of Coron Island (TFCI), a community organization. In fact, five years later all the caves were returned
to the Tagbanua as part of the Stewardship Agreement, which allowed them to manage the area and
the involved resources for 25 years. However, for reclaiming also the coastal and fishing grounds they
had to wait for the issuing of the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC, in 1996). According to
the  DENR  instructions,  the  CADC  is  a  tenurial  instrument  granting  indigenous  communities  the
management and protection rights over land and resources, including coastal and submerged areas
as well (Capistrano: 2010). At this point, the Tagbanuas proceeded with the physical delimitation of
their  domain,  in  order  to  record  the  property  in  the  register  of  deeds.  They  collaborated  with
supporting  NGOs,  mixing  modern  technology  with  local  knowledge  (the  GIS  system  was  used,
meaning a participatory Geographic Information System).  The Tagbanua efforts on codifying their
traditional and customary laws, belief and practices were rewarded by the delivering of the CADC
(1998),  followed  by  the  formulation  of  an  Ancestral  Domain  Management  Plan  for  the  claim
territories. Besides rights concerning land, the Philippines government in 1997 ratified the Indigenous
People's Rights Act (IPRA). This law formally recognized the indigenous rights of ownership over land
and  water  bodies,  traditional  resource  management  practices  and  the  obligation  to  gain  the
community prior consent for developmental plans affecting the ancestral area. An apparently smooth
triumph hides some difficulties for the indigenous community: among these, documents for meetings
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with governmental agencies were first not issued in the local language; then, the Protected Areas
Management Board did not involve local representatives. Moreover, the approval of the CADC was
challenged by the municipal government, since the negative effect on local fishing industry, and due
to the scarce faith in the indigenous ability of self-management (Dalabajan:2001). Then, the obtained
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) was at first never recorded in the Register of the Deeds,
delaying its final  recognition to six years after the official  release of the CADC (Capistrano:2010).
Conflicts  arose  also  with  the  mining  industry:  in  fact,  even  after  the  passage  of  IPRA,  mining
concessions (issued by DENR) given prior to that date were not asked to gain the prior informed
consent  by  the indigenous community  (Capistrano:  2010,  Capistrano & Charles:  2012).  For  what
concern the growing touristic sector, financial funds for developmental projects, resorts and for the
protection  of  conservation  areas  attract  marginalized  fishers,  who  lack  alternative  employment
opportunities.  Therefore,  this  situation  has  created  pressures  regarding  the  development  of
indigenous areas (Fabinyi: 2010). Indeed, 
[f]rom the early ’90s, the pressure on Tagbanwas to leave their island and give way to tourist resort 
owners and developers began to intensify (PAFID:2000, in Fabinyi:2010, p. 423).
In the Philippines, the Tagbanua were the first indigenous people to obtain property rights at
a  constitutional  level  (Capistrano  &Charles:  2012).  In  the  cases  of  Indonesia  and  Brazil,  the
collaboration between local and higher authorities has not led to a likewise recognition of indigenous
people over a claimed domain. 
For  what concern CBM in Gili  Indah,  the revitalization of  indigenous practices for coastal
management  has  seen  the  customary  law  Awig-Awig  at  the  core  of  the  entire  project.  As  an
institution spread in Northwest Lombok, Awig-Awig is meant to regulate the reef fishing management
as a Common Pool Resource. In Gili Indah, its promulgation was helped by the COREMAP (Coral Reef
Rehabilitation  and  Management  Program)  and  the  Bureau  for  Regional  Developmental  Planning
(Satria  et  al:  2004).  The  Awig-Awig  sets  a  number  or  rules  for  environmental  protection  and
sustainable  activities,  which were maintained by  CBM users.  It  includes a well-defined boundary
marked with buoys or floating balls, which ends at 100 m from the coastline and comprehends the
coral reef areas. Moreover, it regulates methods and seasons of fishing as well as prohibited activities,
depending on the coral reef condition. Usually, building consensus is part of the process for decision-
making at  village meetings,  forerun by public  hearings to collect  people's  opinions and requests.
Monitoring its good implementation is left to the local force groups. In the case of violation, Awig-
Awig regulates the type of sanction based on the damage, from monetary fines to the suspension of
the activity or confiscation of the boat: further control comes from the local police and the KSDA
(Agency  for  the  Conservation  of  Natural  Resources)  (Ibid).  In  this  case,  support  from  higher
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institutions for reef conservation can be explained with the government interest in developing Gili
Indah as a Marine Natural Tourism Park (since 1993) (Satria et al:2006). However, interactions among
CBM stakeholders since the establishment of Awig-Awig highlighted two major conflicts related to
resource  ownership:  first,  a  conflict  between  fishers  and  TEs,  and  between  fishers  and  central
government (Satria et al:2004). The first issue derived from the modification of the Awig-Awig in 1999
with a new Awig-Awig released in 2001, which restricted the allowed zones for muroami-netting, still
largely practiced among fishers. But even before it, the adoption of Awig-Awig by the TEs affected the
livelihood of small-scale fishermen. The gradual growing (economic) importance of TEs in decision-
making on resource management is felt by fishermen as a marginalization of their own interests. The
exclusion  of  small  actors  continued  with  the  top-down  approach  of  state  initiatives  such  as
transforming Gili Indah in a Tourism Park and a Water Natural Conservation Area (as Forestry Ministry
policies). The consequence of these projects is the establishment of protected areas as new state
property right, where muroami or other reef fishing practices are prohibited. Some of the newly
created conservation areas overlap with community-managed zones. In other words, Gili Indah seems
governed by a "fake" CBM, since the collision of many stakeholders hinders an active participatory
work by fishermen communities (Satria et al:2004).
The  decentralization  of  fishery  management  reached  different  forms  among  developing
countries. Pre-existing ethnic groups with solid fishing traditions as the Tagbanwa could strengthen
the community demands for the appropriation of resource rights. However, for what concerns fishers
of Patos Lagoon estuary, they are extremely weakened by almost 30 years of top-down management.
The condition of advanced depletion of the Lagoon ecosystem led the state agency IBAMA to create
the Forum of Patos Lagoon, the first initiative towards a CBM system, in 1996. The establishment was
guided by IBAMA's Rio Grande Research Unit and, at a household level, by the Fishing Catholic Body
organization.  The project  looked at  the success of  previous CBM projects in  the close Mirin and
Mangueira  Lagoons.  The  Forum  encouraged  the  21  institutions  (representing  fishermen  groups,
unions, religious movements, universities, government, etc) attending the meetings to propose and
to plan the recovery of the Lagoon environment (Reis &D’Incao: 2000). The first official regulation of
the Forum was published in 1998, after almost three years of fishery regulation review, on fishermen
demand. The main innovations were:
1. Four  months  of  closed  season,  in  which  licensed  fishermen  could  be  eligible  for
unemployment benefit from the government;
2. Limitation of restriction areas to local fishermen activity;
3. Limitation of fishing capacity through a fixed allowed number of nets per fishermen;
4. Limitation of size for the most important species.
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Although  the  new  legislation  was  discussed  with  the  local  fishermen,  they  found  it  to  further
undermine their economic activities, not recognizing that overcapacity and illegal fishing are partly
due to their own small-scale practices (Ibid). Moreover, the outside fishermen, that once exploited
the estuarine resources, complained about the discrepancy between the new access limitation and
the open access condition offered by the National Constitution. Indeed, despite the different property
rights regimes regulating coastal ecosystems, fisheries are formally  considered as an open access
resource by the Brazilian Constitution (D'Incao & Reis:2002). Then, lack of infrastructure and scarce
monitoring planning represented major obstacles to the decentralization of management on behalf of
local institutions represented in the Forum. In the past, the centralized system plus corruption cases
involving  the  commercial  industry  made  the  enforcement  of  coastal  laws  weak  and  ineffective,
hindering  the  importance  of  feedbacks  from  environmental  resources  and  users  accountability
(Kalikoski et al:2002). Finally, another issue concerning the efficiency of the new-born Forum is the
institutional scale and variety. Although one of the priorities of the Forum is the empowerment and
the political inclusion of small-scale communities, the presence of religious movements, industrial
fishery unions and port authorities actually limit the voice the local fishermen (Ibid). 
4.2.2 Community homogeneity
The CBM of Coron Island demonstrates the highest level of community homogeneity. The
Calamian Tagbanwa ethnicity inhabiting Coron Island is clearly separated by other  mainland ethnic
groups. The group is small in size, divided into villages relying on a leader, unified by a shared culture
and religious practices, identifying its connection with the coastal land through historical accounts. I
have  found  a  slightly  different  condition  also  in  Gili  Indah,  where  both  fishermen  and  tourism
entrepreneurs have the same occupational  background,  they belong to the same ethnicities  (the
majority Buginese and Sasak), and they are bounded by kin relationship. However, since the vertical
movement  leading  to  the  stratification  of  the  communities  started  since  the  1980s  with  the
development of tourism facilities, now the community is divided by different economic interests. The
surroundings of Patos Lagoon have seen the formation of  Fishermen Colonies during the second
World War, while the presence of artisanal fisheries goes back to the 19 th century. Besides sharing fish
catches,  information and being  bounded by  kin  ties,  the literature  does not  refer  to  a  common
ethnicity,  culture  or  religious  practice,  while  it  confirms  a  weak  cohesion,  leadership  and  self-
organization  skills.  In  this  case,  the  prioritization  of  commercial  fishing  led  to  the  division  and
competition between users.
When it comes to claiming ownership and management rights over resources and land, the
Calamianes  Tagbanua  from  Coron  Island  authenticated  their  long  traditions  through  historical
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accounts.  They  showed  the  resistance  of  the  communities  to  previous  colonial  structure,  both
Spanish and American, and to the inflow of lowland Filipino culture (Capistrano:2010). Even if their
internal cohesion was threatened by land conflicts with the local authorities, the Tagbanwas were
able  to  push themselves  in  order  to protect  their  ancestral  land and human rights.  Discipline  in
observing  customary  laws  and  the  massive  effort  in  catching  up  with  the  governmental  system
requirements contributed to the empowerment of the community members (Sampang:2007, Mayo-
Anda et al:2006). The Calamianes Tagbanuas differ from the mainland Tagbanwas for dependency on
fishing, edible bird nests collection, group-oriented fishing practices, sharing culture of the surplus
and specific food taboos related to geographical areas or season: all these practices gave rise to a
unique sense of identity among seafarers Tagbanwas, as the protectors of a milestone environmental
site (Mayo-Anda et al:2006). However, in the last two decades, migrants and tourism development
are challenging the community.  Since 2004, increasing touristic flows,  building and renovating of
infrastructure  pressured  the  ancestral  land  of  Tagbanwas,  who  felt  marginalized  from  the
developmental  dialogue.  The increasing arrival  of  migrant (especially  Visayas)  brought also illegal
fishing practices endangering the coral reef and local economic opportunities. Towards these facts,
Calamian Tagbanwas struggle in asking to the local municipality cooperation for the enforcement of
the law, due to their low capacity of human resources and technology. On the other side, tourism is
an  attractive  alternative  for  increasing  household  incomes,  and  it  becomes  more  attractive  in  a
condition of declining marine resource. In this sense, stratification of the Tagbanwas communities
cannot be considered an issue yet, but it could become another issue challenging the cohesion of the
indigenous  people  (Fabinyi:2010;  Mayo-Anda  et  al:2006).  Moreover,  the  diminishing  number  of
households on Coron Island is due also to emigration to the mainland for job seeking or education of
the youngest (Sampang:2007). 
Comparing  to  this  picture,  Gili  Indah  communities  are  less  homogeneous  and  contain
ethnicities  coming  from  both  mainland  Lombok  and  from  South  Sulawesi:  the  main  groups  are
Sasaks,  Buginese,  Javanese,  Mandarese and Makassarnese.  In  particular,  indigenous communities
from Lombok and fishers from South Sulawesi claim to be the first settlers of the three little islands
since  the  end  of  the  19th  century.  Anyway,  Hidayat  (2006)  argued  that  despite  the  variety  of
ethnicities,  the  local  communities  were  able  to  bound  and  adapt  the  customary  law  awig-awig
(spread in Northwest Lombok as a form of indigenous knowledge, revitalized after the fall of Suharto)
for their needs. Familiar relationships helped the resolution of infra-communities conflict, through
meetings  among  village  leaders  and  marriages.  On  the  other  side,  this  system  undermined  the
enforcement of local rules: due to the kin ties, sanction liability could be easily avoided (Hidayat:
2006).  Overall,  while  Gili  Air  and  Gili  Meno  remained  dependent  on  fisheries,  the  bigger  Gili
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Trawangan has become the most visited island, for its ability to create enough touristic facilities.
Indeed,  the  previous  elite  fishers  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  tourism  since  the  1980s
(Hidayat:2006; Afifi:2011). This initial community stratification continued with a further separation:
fishers are divided between muroami-net supporters and who condemn this destructive method.
Among the last group we find pro-TEs, who prioritize the protection of coral reef as the main fuel for
attracting tourists: among supporters of muroami-net there are fishers who argue about the historical
continuity of the practice (even if it was introduced during the Japanese occupation) and about its
formal recognition by the authorities. This internal conflict influenced negatively the legitimacy of
CBM fishery regulations; indeed Satria et al. (2006) argued that internal disparities created by the
CBM of coral reef have increased inequalities in Gili Indah society (Satria et al:2006).
For what concerns small-scale fisheries in Patos Lagoon estuary, the selected literature indeed
does  not  mention  settlement  origins,  ethnic  composition  or  hierarchical  structure  of  the
communities.  The  lack  of  detailed  information  mirrors  the  idea  of  a  scattered  and  disorganized
human capital.  Moreover,  depending on my research, even the structure of  the single fishermen
village  is  not  clear.  However,  small-scale  fisheries  both  for  domestic  and  commercial  purposes
accounted for the 80% of the total landing for the State of Rio Grande do Sul in 1966, decreasing in
the next decades as the conflicts with industrial vessels and the depletion of resources intensified
(Kalikoski et al:2002; Reis & D'Incao:2000). The reduction of catches and the traditional top-down
approach  of  fishery  management  have  been  the  main  causes  leading  to  the  fragmentation and
weakening of  the communities.  Management norms were complied neither by fishermen nor by
external users, who, facing conflicts with commercial fisheries, opted for expanding fishing routes and
for anticipating the fishing season. Finally,  it  seems that the FPL does not empower or unify the
communities: indeed, there are no specifications for fishers organization or group, or requirements
for village leaders, perpetrating the situation of indefiniteness (Reis &D'Incao:2000). 
4.2.3 ITK implementation.
The small-scale fishermen communities who have been able to better implement the body of
indigenous traditional knowledge (ITK) in the development of CBM are located in Philippines and
Indonesia.  The  Tagbanua  show  a  rich  and  dense  tradition  of  traditional  fisheries  techniques,
sustainability knowledge as period restriction, size and fishing gears, using the collected historical
knowledge  for  delimiting  property  boundaries.  On  the  other  side,  I  found  controversial  the
implementation of  ITK in Gili  Indah.  The customary law Awig-Awig is  per se a collection of  local
knowledge: however, when adopted by the whole range of stakeholders of the coral reef, it has been
manipulated against the fishermen group. Then, muroami-netting, which is still legally practiced even
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if highly dangerous for the preservation of coral reef, is included as well in the traditional practices.
This shows a lack of observation and information among small-scale fishermen about conservation,
weakening  their  voice.  In  Patos  Lagoon,  competition  for  resources  with  the  industrial  sector
undermined  the  implementation  of  ITK,  leading  to  a  gradual  loss  of  knowledge.  However,  the
collaboration  with  scientists  after  the  establishment  of  the  Forum shows that  fishermen  groups
indeed had developed fishing pattern depending on ecosystem changes, seasons and delimitation of
nurture areas. 
In the literature referred to the Calamian Tagbanua communities, there is strong evidence of a
rooted awareness on nature conservation and sustainable activities. They are said to believe in the
spirits embedded in nature, which is considered as the mother of life and for this reason must be
respected (Sampang: 2007). The livelihood of the village and their economic activities are integrated
with practices related to conservation of the biodiversity, by establishing sacred protected areas for
the regeneration of fishes, or by using simple gear methods such as hook-and-line. These methods
could not guarantee a sufficient surplus  in order to develop commercial  fishery or  an expanding
population. (Capistrano: 2010). Fish species are classified by specific terms in the local languages,
fixed in the traditional knowledge through observations. The role of village leaders is fundamental in
establishing these rules as they represented the customary law, institutionalizing also sanction and
corporal punishments (Mayo-Anda et al: 2006; Mangahas: 2010). The collected information has been
implemented in the collaboration with research units for data collection on existing biodiversity and
fishing management and practices (see Sampang: 2007). However, ITK was particularly fundamental
for the delimitation of community boundaries, in order to apply for the previously mentioned CADC.
During the process of map drawing, fishermen could proof their legitimacy on the claimed areas
demonstrating a detailed knowledge of the existing fishing practices and resources. Their idea and
initial map drawings were integrated with the GIS technology by external associations: the corrected
maps would have become the legal basis for facing further challenges. On the other side, Awig-Awig,
as a complex set of cultural practices for coral reef conservation, is one of the most spread customary
laws in North and West Lombok. However, there are proofs of different complexity level between
Awig-Awig of Gili Indah and other locations. Some scholars argued that due to the recent settlement
of  the  three  little  islands  the  local  rules  are  less  rooted  in  the  community,  comparing  to  other
previous indigenous knowledge systems, for example sawen or sasi (Satria & Matsuda: 2004; Satria &
Adhuri:  2010).  Anyway,  with  the  establishment  of  Awig-Awig  in  1998/99  in  Gili  Indah,  the
conservation practices, as well as fishing grounds definition and allocation, were all codified in a legal
document.  In this  case,  the detailed regulations of  the new CBM followed the footprints of  oral
knowledge collected through observations and passed down from generation to generation (Satria &
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Matsuda: 2004). For this reason, among the three case studies, the CBM of coral reef in Gili Indah
shows the  best  level  of  initial  implementation of  indigenous  traditional  knowledge.  In  a  second
moment, however, the TEs, gaining more influence in the coral reef conservation, pressured for the
prioritization of  fishing grounds restriction and for the prohibition of  muroami-net,  aligning their
vision with  the policy  of  municipal  authorities.  Dealing  with  a  total  opposite  system of  fisheries
management,  the  traditional  knowledge  of  artisanal  fishermen  in  Patos  Lagoon  has  never  been
recognized until  the establishment of  the Forum. However,  the literature confirms the existence,
since the 19th century, of small-scale fisheries patterns defining fishing grounds, regeneration areas,
working  groups bounded by kin relations or friendship.  Moreover,  fishermen collected important
information about the seasonal movements of fish stocks, codified in the fish calendar. They adapted
the fishing technologies to fish species and specific periods of the calendar (Kalikoski et al: 2002;
Kalikoski et al:2010). The first regulation issued by the Forum in 1998 was the result of almost three
years of collaboration between fishermen and scientific institutions. One of the most pro-fishermen
achievement was the re-definition of the fishing calendar, based on real-time data about fish species
population. Secondly, thanks to the geographical knowledge of local fishermen, they delimited the
artisanal fishery operation zones, which without clear boundaries are affected by illegal fishing from
outsiders  or  industrial  vessels.  The  strategy  implemented  tried  to  combine  the  two  types  of
knowledge into a common knowledge base,  that  could provide the better solution to fishermen
demand after reaching the consensus of both parts (Reis & D’Incao: 2002). Although from this picture
the indigenous knowledge in Patos Lagoon could seem quite developed, its past exclusion from the
management system led to its weakening. Then, due to the moving of fishers looking for economic
opportunities, part of the knowledge inherited by communities members have left the lagoon with
them forever.                                    
4.2.4 Community pro-activity.
 From  the  analysis  of  the  commitment  of  communities’  members  in  overcoming  their
situation  of  exclusion  from  fisheries  management,  we  can  divide  the  cases  into  two  opposite
scenarios. One one side, the Calamian Tagbanwas show an extreme pro-activity in forming their own
associations and applying  for  property  recognition,  even through the collaboration with  external
organizations. They were assisted by sympathetic actors who could provide with the essential training
about  legal  terms and  fisheries  norms.  On  the  other  side,  fishermen in  the Patos  Lagoon seem
struggling  to  adapt  to  the  new decentralized  paradigm:  they  rely  on  governmental  agencies  for
monitoring  and  enforcement,  but  they  have  not  become  promoters  of  the  change.  The  long
imposition of a top-down approach left a deep mark, hard to reverse. However, Fishermen Colonies
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gave proof of their commitment through a modest participation at workshops and researches for
implementing new regulations. I would say that the Gili Indah experience lays in the middle of these
two opposite  situations.  The diffused  awareness  towards  the  reef  ecosystem and  the restriction
initiatives proposed by the communities (mostly by TEs) emerges in the participation of small-scale
fishermen in initial meetings and training. However, the newly established institutions are perceived
as low and ineffective since fishers non-compliance. New changes are not yet internalized by the
community, in a way that Awig-Awig is not enforced by the direct users of the CBM. 
Looking first at the latter case, CBM implementation in Gili Indah was planned and directed
by  the  University  of  Mataram  in  collaboration  with  the  Regional  Government  of  West  Lombok
Regency  based  on  socio-economic  surveys  completed  by  a  Developmental  Planning  Board.  The
communities were previously informed and consulted through several meetings. The initial activities
included  several  English  and  diving  courses,  seaweed  cultivation  training,  with  high  rates  of
community  participation.  In  fact,  they  satisfied  the  need  of  communities  members,  who  took
advantage from the teachings in order to improve their condition. Other steps were the creation of a
resource  management  groups,  divided  in  conservation,  beach  watch  and  welfare  division.  The
implementation included also the formation of a coral reef management plan based on Awig-Awig,
with a system of boards in each village to spread awareness. The fulfilment of all these projects was
made possible due to the participation of NGOs, and local private business (Afifi:2011). Moreover, to
monitor the observance of Awig-Awig, the Gili Indah Youth Task Force was established in 2000. The
system had immediately good results  for what concerns the prohibition of blast fishing (Satria &
Matsuda: 2004).  In particular, in Gili Trawangan (where most of the tourism facilities are located), the
monitoring force was backed by Eco-trust, an organization aiming to raise funds. From 2002, each
village developed its own monitoring task force, financially supported by the respective TEs operating
in the area. Two main factors decreased the legitimacy of the monitoring force from fishermen’s
perspective: the lack of coordination among enforcement bodies (leading to a deterioration of the
Youth Task Force group), and monthly wages to the force members, although in the CBM model
monitoring  should  be a  common responsibility  (Satria  et  al:2006).  Then,  the literature  does not
provide a clear image of fishermen organization in Gili Indah, in relation to higher institutions. Their
demands are represented by the LMNLU, a kind of fishers association whose scope comprehends the
whole  Northern  Lombok  region.  Marginalization  of  Gili  Indah  fishers  continues  also  inside  this
network, since Gili Indah fishers are accused to be often blast fishing practitioners (Ibid). Although the
initial  promising  involvement  of  fishermen  and  community  members  in  general,  the  newly
established institutions faced acceptance problems. The increasing importance of TEs in the CBM, the
inadequate  resources  to  improve  facilities,  and  the  renovated  formality  of  Awig-Awig  as  a  new
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government  tool,  have contributed to decreasing  the legitimacy level  of  Awig-Awig  itself  among
fishers (Afifi:2011). Therefore, scarce obedience and poor enforcement capacity caused a low level of
pro-activity of fishermen in trying to regain their property rights over Gili Indah fishing grounds. 
Analysing the evolution of Patos Lagoon small-scale fisheries after the establishment of the
Forum, it is possible to find some of the same patterns of the CBM application in Gili Indah. First of
all,  the  Forum  of  Patos  Lagoon  was  highly  supported  by  IBAMA  Rio  Grande  Research  Unit,  a
governmental research body, on the model of previous successful CBM in the region. It included also
the Fishing Catholic Body, local religious movements developing activities with fishers’ families. The
first initiative of the Forum was reviewing the existing fishery regulation. For the first three years,
fishermen collaborated with researchers in order to collect data on fishing gears, catch size, capacity
effort  limit,  closed season and composition of  fish stocks,  making available  local  knowledge and
facilities for expeditions (Reis & D’Incao:2000). Then, after the release of the first official regulation,
fishers’  complains  and  inaccuracy  mistakes  led  again  fishers’  community  to  collaborate  for
recollection of  data  in  order  to  elaborate  a  more  effective strategy  (see  the  case  of  the  fishing
calendar, Kalikoski et al: 2004). However, the initial enthusiasm towards the benefits originated by the
Forum started to diminish soon. Since the new regulations did not bring an immediate improvement
in profit terms, a growing sense of dissatisfaction was felt among fishermen, due to low education
and lack of a long-term vision. On the other side, the Forum itself  does not pressure small-scale
fishermen to self-organize monitoring activities of the surroundings. In 1997 the State Environmental
Police (PATRAM) was established as a law enforcement tool; this is another hint that enforcement is
still expected to follow a top-down approach, with the exclusion of the direct users. Few pressures for
more  autonomy  by  indigenous  communities  comes  also  from  the  long  tradition  of  centralized
management. Some scholars argue that fishermen do not consider themselves integrated into the
system leading to  the coastal  resources degradation:  they accuse in the first  place the intensive
fishing sector and inefficient regulations as responsible of the existing situation (Reis &D’Incao:2000).
In  addition,  there  are  some  important  constraints  to  fishermen  representation  at  the  Forum
meetings:  meetings  are  often held  during  working  hours,  in  one  of  the  IBAMA offices  in  urban
centres, difficult to be reached by most of the community. This means the participation of a limited
number  of  communities  members,  included  the  fishery  organization  leaders,  who  mostly  are
politicians or commercial middlemen without an occupational background similar to the people they
represent  (Kalikoski:  2004,  Kalikoski  et  al:  2010).  Finally,  the  lack  of  a  common  vision  and  low
empowerment  perception  by  small-scale  fishermen  hinder  their  self-organizing  skills  and
commitment to create better facilities for resource management.
35
As mentioned at  the beginning of this  section, the performances of Gili  Indah and Patos
Lagoon fishermen in reclaiming their space in decision-making are totally different from the Calamian
Tagbanua’s struggle.  Probably  the most evident  difference lies  in the strength of  the community
organizations: in the Tagbanua society, the loyalty toward an outspoken leader follows the structure
of the village. The Tagbanua Foundation of Coron Island (TFCI, 1985) founded in order to apply to a
resource stewardship, showed a clear “manifesto” of intentions. Among the latter, there are respect
and recognition of  customary laws;  the revival  of  Calamian tradition;  reduction of  illegal  fishing;
decreasing the number of migrants in the island (Mayo-Anda et al: 2006). To reach the stated aims,
the community needed external aid, due to the spread poverty condition and the lack of information
or  facilities.  These  latter  were  provided  by  national  and  international  NGOs:  Conservation
International supported the communities for what concerns biological resource assessment, while
the  Environmental  Legal  Assistant  Centre  provided training  on property  rights.  Furthermore,  the
Philippines Association for Intercultural Development gave high support for maps drawing, making
available advanced technology (GIS system) (Capistrano: 2010; Mayo-Anda et al:2006). Later, the TFCI
decided to merge in the Saragpunta, a federation of several communities associations of the various
Calamian Tagbanua villages, gaining more allies and more democratic power (Mayo-Anda et al: 2006).
With the acceptance of the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim and Title, the Tagbanua had the
rights to resist further government initiatives touching their own territory. Moreover, they pressured
the publishing authority to have the legal  documents written in the local  language.  With a total
autonomy over the domain,  the community is  engaged in  the collection of  tourists’  fees,  in the
control of tourists’ number allowed to visit the areas, and in the monitoring of surrounding waters
from illegal activities (Capistrano:2010). In conclusion, it is possible to identify the successful features
of  Tagbanua  communities’  involvement  during  the  establishment  of  CBM.  These  are:  a  strong
community organization, based on the sense of solidarity and support among tribal villagers, and the
collaboration with sympathetic groups (Dalabajan:2001). Then, the Tagbanua showed a high sense of
community empowerment derived from the members’ participation in local organization; there is a
strong seeking of a bottom-up approach, which has at the core the communities association demands
and pressures for legal rights (Mayo-Anda et al:2006). 
4.3 Discussion.
The three case studies are different portraits of the results of CBM application in small-scale
fishermen communities. Indigenous fishermen are affected by the negative effect of ocean grabbing,
such as resource conflicts with the industrial fishery or tourism sector, yet their responses to it led to
incredibly  different  performances.  A  first  look  at  the analyzed  data  highlights  how the  historical
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continuity of dispossession and marginalization have a strong influence on fishermen involvement as
well as on the speed of the decentralization process in the present. If the Tagbanua were able to
overcome this issue working on indigenous rights, while Indonesia saw a revitalization of customary
regimes after the fall of Suharto, the situation in Patos Lagoon seem paralyzed by old management
patterns. Indeed, the decentralized control seems to be better legitimized if there is a compatibility
with pre-existing coastal or fisheries policies. Both Philippines and Indonesia are well-known for long
tradition  of  indigenous  people  governing  small-scale  fisheries,  even  prior  to  the  adoption  of  a
centralized  system  (Pomeroy:  1995).  This  can  explain  why  decentralization  policies  and  the
revitalization of participatory governance were more accepted. Brazil fisheries, and in particular the
wealthy  Patos  Lagoon  estuary,  has  never  been  object  of  government  policies  towards  the
empowerment of small-scale fishermen (Reis &D’Incao: 2000). Observing the four main determinants
of CBM success, I found that a supporting legal frame is not enough for securing fishermen access
rights. This could seem a contradiction, but it is possible to understand more observing the case of
Gili  Indah.  Due  to  the  internal  conflicts  between  fishermen  and  TEs,  the  customary  law  once
regulating the fishing activities has turned into a restricting policy, benefiting the promoters of no-
take areas and enclosures. Even in Patos Lagoon, the new regulation issued by the Forum is not
enforceable without the appropriate modifications also in the industrial sector activities, or in the
constitutional open access. On the other side, if the legal changes are pushed by a unified civil society
as  in  the  case  of  Coron  Island,  the  CBM  has  more  probabilities  to  be  efficient  for  small-scale
fishermen interests. This suggests that the community commitment for a reversal of regulation is not
enough, but the decentralization must be promoted in first place by the government, as in the case of
the indigenous rights act or the ancestral domain claim by the Philippines. Then, from the analysis it
emerges that  the community  homogeneity  cannot  always  guarantee a  better  implementation of
CBM.  As  the  case  of  Gili  Indah  demonstrates,  even  though  different  stakeholders  inside  the
community possess the same ethnic or occupational background, the participatory governance is
fragile, while infra-community conflicts persist. On the other side, Tagbanua used their own ethnic
uniqueness as a pillar of their struggle, something not possible to achieve in the weakened condition
of  small-scale  fisheries  in  Patos  Lagoon.  Community  homogeneity  is  connected  to  the  use  of
traditional knowledge, as a proof  of  the indigenous legacy towards resource management.  While
fishers  in  Patos  Lagoon are  skeptical  towards the new regulations imposed in  collaboration with
scientific researchers, in Coron Island the display of environmental knowledge improved directly the
livelihood of the Tagbanuas by delimiting their own domain. Curiously, although the formalization of
Awig-Awig followed the cultural norms developed in Gili Indah, and more in general in Northwestern
Lombok, the tight grip by the TEs on the law terms restricted fishers operational zones. Nevertheless,
a good improvement on awareness towards coral reef health was achieved (Afifi: 2011).  By the same
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token, less management opportunities to fishers mean less inclusion in  decision-making and low
commitment  among  fishers  in  complying  with  the  rules.  However,  this  brings  also  to  more
vulnerability  in front of  external  threats, since the community is  not unified under an integrated
management plan. Besides the positive response in all the three sites to initial meetings, workshops
and training sessions in order to learn the essential information of the new governance system, pro-
activity performances differ extremely. Community commitment lacks whenever the new established
institutions are not internalized into the social structures (as in the case of Gili Indah), or when they
reflect the continuity with a top-down approach (as in Patos Lagoon). As the exception, apparently,
fisheries  organizations  in  Coron  Islands  worked  thanks  to  the  real  commitment  of  the  whole
community in taking the reins of the resource management in the first place. In conclusion, CBM
hides  many  difficulties  for  the  involved  community,  and many are  the  wrong steps  on the path
towards a full decentralization. In the analyzed cases, CBM has been surely effective when it comes
with: the consideration of community’s values and the rising of awareness on conservation practices
and relative importance of local knowledge. Then, in some cases better than others, CBM has secured
a reversal in regulation towards small-scale fishermen, depending on the government willingness to
share the management responsibilities and to continue the decentralization process generally started
in  the  1990s.  The  level  of  opportunities  and  management  power  given  to  the  community  are
proportionate to  the response of  fishers,  in  constituting representative organization to fit  in  the
developmental dialogue with higher institution. Something that CBM seems not able to resolve is the
establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms, which can be considered fair and equal for all the
involved stakeholders. The prevention of conflicts seems to be a good alternative, as in the case of
the Tagbanuas, whose domain is legally recorded as a common property under defined boundaries.
However, for the other two cases, the major conflicts derive from infra-government disputes over the
allocation of resources, in which indigenous communities’ voice are not considered.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
Ocean  grabbing  has  threatened  the  small-scale  fishers  communities  belonging  to  Coron
Island, Gili  Indah and Patos Lagoon in various ways. Yet, in all  the three cases, the dispossession
practices  are  comparable  due  to  their  similarities  with  the  ocean  grabbing  model  commonly
accepted.  Indigenous  communities  are  harmed by  confused  fisheries  policies  and  poor  resource
governance, corresponding to a worsening in their socioeconomic wealth and food security (Bennet
et al:2015). The traditional management for the Calamian Tagbanua of Coron Island was reduced by
the coercive seizure of land, by migrants’ illegal fishing and by tourism pressures (Capistrano: 2010;
Fabinyi:  2010).  For  Gili  Indah  fishers  tourism  development  and  coral  reef  degradation  are  the
principal threats to their livelihood, based on reef fishery (Satria et al: 2006). Finally, Patos Lagoon
communities  have  been  extremely  marginalized  by  the  prioritization  of  large-scale  commercial
fisheries and by the depletion of marine resources (Kalikoski et al:2002).  However, a Community-
based  Management  model  of  coastal  resource  was  adopted  in  the  three  sites  to  contrast  the
exclusion of fishers. Indeed, through its human rights approach and users participation in decision-
making, this type of decentralized governance is supposed to develop an efficient and sustainable
management of the resource (Blaikie:2006; Graham et al:2006).  Although the application of CBM is
customized  depending  on  the  prior  socioeconomic  features  of  the  concerned  community,  the
preservation of fishers access rights reaches different efficiency scores. It emerges that regulations
are reversed towards small-scale fishers when the decentralization is sufficiently promoted by higher
authorities. Then, pressures from a cohesive community fasten the process, since the civil society
gives proof to be a solid recipient for further policies. Moving forward, I found that the representative
organizations  for  fishers  participation,  created  by  CBM,  have  a  modest  impact  on  community
empowerment. This occurs first when local people are not able to take over external agents or the
government at the leadership of the new-born organisms. Secondly, it occurs when the users do not
understand their primary importance in the resource-management and are not committed to comply
with  the  rules.  Finally,  CBM  does  not  guarantee  a  one-way  method  to  avoid  or  resolve  arisen
conflicts, which are still threatening the small-scale fishermen property. I affirm that external support
and internal commitment constitutes the successful aspects of CBM. Causes such as poverty and
illiteracy are major constraints to the self-development of the analyzed communities: that is why the
CBM efficacy is still highly dependent on the governance quality of local authorities. Further research
should  consider  on  better  addressing  the  shortcomings  of  the  CBM  implementation  for  what
concerns the internalization process in the local indigenous institutions.
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APPENDIX
1. Case studies data table.
Supportive Legal Frame
Coron Island
(PH)
• (1987) Philippine Constitution guaranteed the rights of Indigenous People on
ancestral  domain,  as the legal  owner of  traditional  land (Capistrano:2010;
Dalabajan:2001)
• Inclusion  in  decision-making  process:  in  1992,  the  National  Integrated
Protected Area System (NIPAS) ensured the participation of IP in protected
area  management  and  decision  making.  Then,  the  Environmental  Critical
Areas Networks (ECAN) identified and recognized the tribal ancestral zones
(Capistrano:2010)
• (1985) Forests stewardship for the Tagbanua (Community Forest Stewardship
Agreement)
• (1993)  Department  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  issued  the
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim which recognizes the preferential rights
of indigenous community to extract, exploit, manage and protect ancestral
territory.(Capistrano:2010, Dalabajan:2001) 
• (1996)  DENR  issued  Ancestral  Domain  Management  Plan  required  for  IP
planning fundamental rights and practices of IP domain (approved in 1998
including island and surrounding sea) (Capistrano:2010, Dalabajan: 2001)
• (1997) Indigenous People Rights Act: comprehensive system for protecting IP
rights. 3 basic rights (1) established NCIP as government agency to formulate
policies  (Capistrano:  2010)  (2)it  describes  IP  ownership  as  private  and
communal,  which  cannot  be  disposed  or  sold  (3)  Free  Prior  Indigenous
Consent (Mayo-Anda et al: 2006) (Capistrano&Charles: 2012) 
Gili Indah 
(IN)
• Awig-awig established in 1999 (before they were initiatives taken by local
people to overcome destructive fishing) already part of fishermen livelihood:
establishment  of  protected,  buffer  and exploit  zones,  prohibited  practices
and authorized appropriation act (Satria &Adhuri: 2010)
• Compatibility  with  traditional  Awig-Awig.  Aspects  of  awig-awig:  1  defined
boundaries (physical marks but poor communication), 2 congruence between
appropriation and provision rules (3 zones), 3 collective-choice arrangements,
4  monitoring  (Youth  Task  Force,  Eco-trust,  sub-village  group),  5  sanctions
(support  by police and KSDA),  6 conflict-resolution mechanism, 7 minimal
recignition to organize, 8 nested enterprise (Satria et al: 2006)
• Law for restriction of marine biota collection and pearl culture (Satria et al
2006)
• (1999) Local  autonomy Law supporting local  decentralization (Satria  et  al:
2004)
• Lombok  Barat  Regency  Government  signed  the  Awig-awig  of  Gili  Indah
recognizing  the importance of  devolution of  coastal  management  to  local
comm (Satria  &Matsuda:2004);  Supported by  bureau for  regional  develop
planning→ formulation of legal text for awig-awig (Satria et al: 2004)
• Compatbility  with  formal  laws:  fisheries  law  1985,  fine  and  confinement;
environmental law 1997 (Satria &Matsuda:2004; Satria et al:2006)
Patos • Legal frame formed by regulation of 1998 by Forum of Patos Lagoon agreed
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Lagoon (BR) with  fishermen  (closed  season,  access  restriction,  reduction  of  capacity,
allowed  size  and  gear  methods)  (Reis  &  D’Incao:  2000);  restriction  as
boundaries and access restriction through local-based licences to fishermen
as first activity (Kalikoski et al:2002) 
• IBAMA as enforcement agency part of FPL(reis &Incao: 2000) 
• FLP as democratization of knowledge and inclusion of fishermen population
(Reis & D’Incao: 2002)
Community homogeneity
Coron Island
(PH)
• resistance  to  colonization,  unchanged  own  customs,  traditions,  link  with
ancestors’ culture, they claim the sovereignty through customs and traditions
and indigenous socio-political institutions (Capistrano: 2010) 
• mostly  subsistence  fisheries,  with  small  commercial  activity;  deep  share
cultures (Capistrano: 2010)
• due to depletion their condition is of extreme poverty without means to fight
back (Dalabajan: 2001)
• one  ethnicity  Calamian,  while  multi-ethnicity  due  to  mass  movement  of
migrants (Dalabajan: 2001)
• small  communities  with  clear  structure:  trust  in  outspoken  leader  of  the
village (Mayo-Anda et al:2006)  
Gili Indah 
(IN)
• Comm divided in  anti-  and pro-  muroami fishing,  in  other  words Tourism
Entrepreneurs (TES) and fishermen; in fact stratification of community since
vertical mobility among elite fishermen who became Tes (Satria et al:2006)  
• Multi-ethnicity: 75% are Bunginese (South Suwalesi),  other Sasak (Lombok
mainland), but same settlement period, the bounded by kin relations among
villages. However, fishers and TEs shares same previous occupational status
and ethnic background (Satria et al. 2006)
• new  Awig-Awig  reduced  fishing  grounds,  polarization  of  the  community
between  fishermen  and  Tes  (whose  profit  from  the  coral  reef)  (Satria  et
al:2006)
Patos 
Lagoon (BR)
• Artisanal  fishery  existed  since  19th  century,  mainly  for  crustaceans  and
teleosts,  shrimps; mostly for commercial  fishery in main markets in North
Brazil; in PL small-scale fisheries involves 3500 fish now (from 5000) (Reis &
D’Incao: 2000).
• Due to top-down approach, No self-enforcement of local  rules before FPL
(Reis & D’Incao: 2000).
• Presence of different fishermen communities around the municipalities of PL;
most  of  them  exclusive  fishermen  with  traditional  stownets,  other  as  a
second living coming from more developed areas (Kalikoski et al:2010)
• Due  to  stock  depletion,  weakened  communities  looked  for  livelihood
alternatives  and  moved  in  other  places→  disruption  of  the  community
(Kalikoski et al:2010)
• Friendship and kinship bound community members to overcome difficulties,
there  is  a  share  culture  of  monitoring  and  fishing  gears  and  information
(Kalikoski et al:2010)
• Some  municipalities  have  better  ties  than  others:  in  general,  no  social
cohesion,  weak  self  organization,  weak  leadership  →  less  power  in
exploitation resources (Kalikoski et al:2010)
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• Dependency  on  middlemen  for  commercial  fisheries→  less  autonomy
(Kalikoski et al:2010)
• 4 main fishery colonies around PL= professional organizations of fishermen
recognized by the Federal Government (Kalikoski et al 2004) (since WWII)
Indigenous Traditional Knowledge
Coron Island
(PH)
• Belief in nature spirits, conservation related practices; sacred protected area;
avoiding of species for health or regeneration period, part of an oral tradition,
use of traditional fishing gears (Capistrano: 2010) 
• local language for fish species, plants and sacred area names, large range of
byproducts used in the everyday life (Mayo-Anda et al:2006) 
• passage  of  laws  by  the  elders  (cutting  trees  ecc)  sanction  and  corporal
punishment (Mangahas:2010)
• ITK  implementation  for  drawing  maps  for  CADC  through  GIS  (Capistrano:
2010) 
Gili Indah 
(IN)
• Awig-awig is part of the cultural system of Lombok fisheries, to protect the
environment from destructive fishing practices,  blast  and bombing, protect
traditional fisheries and keep traditional culture related to it; however Awig-
Awig of Gili Indah is less rooted and complex than other localities in North
Lombok  due  also  to  the  recent  settlement  of  the  islands  (Satria  &
Matsuda:2004)
Patos 
Lagoon (BR)
• Previous artisanal fishery patterns by areas, kin working group, clearly defined
seasonal pattern and fish calendar (Kalikoski et al:2002)
• Previous definition of fishing grounds, technologies and periods by fishermen
through  artisanal  trawling,  ex  for  pink  shrimps  and  mullets  (Kalikoski  et
al:2002)
• Fishing  calendar  one of  the most  important  and detailed tool  to  resource
management adapted through climate change and years  and regulation of
exploitation (Kalikoski et al:2010)
• New  regulation  of  FPL  were  decided  depending  on  comm  demands  and
integrating fish knowledge with scientific one. Redefinition of fishing calendar
was effective with mullet and shrimps (Reis &D’Incao: 2002)
Community Pro-activity
Coron Island
(PH)
• (1985)  Tagbanua  Foundation→  apply  to  CFSA  with  DENR  for  a  forest
stewardship (25 years) (Capistrano: 2010)
• Philippines association for Intercultural Development (NGO) collaboration of
maps drawing (GIS + ITK) (Capistrano: 2010) (Mayo-Anda et al:2006)
• collaboration  and  support  from  Conservation  International  for  biological
resource  assessment,  Environmental  Legal  Assistant  Centre  for  training  on
rights (Capistrano: 2010)
• Resistance  to  government  to  policies  promoted  without  prior  community
consent;  pressure  for  document  written  in  local  language;  pressure  for
finalizing the Tagbanua domain in the register of deeds, collection of tourism
fees and control of tourists’ access (Capistrano: 2010)
• Strong community organization; solidarity and support among tribal villagers,
collaboration with sympathetic groups, NGOs, civil society (Dalabajan: 2001)
• High sense of community power: bottom up approach; the community first
42
applied for legal recognition guided by the leader (Mayo-Anda et al:2006) 
• Collecting tourists fee and controlling entrance number; the money are used
for maintenance of boats or for paying volunteers (Mayo-Anda et al:2006)
• Clear  scope and aims of  Tagbanua Foundation as  a statute (Mayo-anda et
al:2006)  
• Formation  of  the  Saragpunta,  a  federation  of  several  communities
associations of the various Tagbanua barangays (Mayo-anda et al:2006)  
• Community  participation  as  the  most  important  feature  of  Tagbanwa
struggle→ legalized with FPCI (Mayo-Anda et al:2006)  
Gili Indah 
(IN)
• Most fishers not aware of the Awig-awig boundaries since written in formal
indonesian (Satria et al. 2006)
• low  participation  in  public  hearing  and  consensus  building  in  territorial
representation (Satria et al: 2006)
• Lack  of  coordination  of  monitoring  activities  (Youth,  Eco-trust,  sub-village)
security task force paid as an improperty→ illegitimate by fishers, who prefer
police as is not a legal organization (Satria et al. 2006). 
• No pressure for translating awig-awig in local language (product of the formal
organizations) (Satria et al 2006)
• University  of  Mataram and regional  government  of  West  Lombok Regency
planned the CBM, since no existing management group they founded one
each island for coral reef management (monitoring and cleaning tasks); good
participation in training and workshops (Afifi:2011)
• Strong participation of NGO, university, private local business (Afifi:2011)
• problem in accepting the local institutions formed with CBM, if  not rooted
they lack legitimacy; awig-awig zoning system have poor enforcement due to
misunderstanding with local authorities role; but also due to poor knowledge
of the law→ break the rules without feeling guilty (Afifi:2011)
• Establishment of new organization due to non-resident of Gili  Indah (other
reason of non compliance by residents (Afifi:2011)
• LMNLU (or Fishery Council of Northern Lombok) is a fishermen organization
representing all awig-awig fishermen in North Lombok, so it involve also Gili
Indah, (Satria &Matsuda:2004)
• non-enforceability  of  zoning  system  due  to  conflict  between  tourism  and
fishery (Satria &Matsuda:2004)
• Prohibition of destructive fishery was successful (Satria &Matsuda:2004)
Patos 
Lagoon (BR)
• FPL  born  for  participatory  governance:  supported  by  IBAMA  Rio  Grande
Research Unit  on model  of  previous successful  CBM.   Inclusion of  Fishing
Catholic Body. FLP has piramid structure (21 institutions of fishermen, Ngos,
religious  movements,  industrial  sector,  universities  and  municipals,  then
General assembly and Directive Board (Reis & D’Incao: 2000)
• First  regulation  in  1998  after  3  years  of  consultations  with  users  through
surveys. → resistance by fishermen due to lack of education and short-term
profit seeking individual behavior (Reis & D’Incao: 2000) → Users not perceive
the CBM as a whole system (comm, NGO, govern, univ, private)(Reis &D’Incao:
2000)
• Participation  in  workshop  and  partially  acceptance  of  new  legislation,
illiterate, low cultural level (new licences) (Reis & D’Incao: 2000)
• Values of  community and contribution taken into account for the 1st  time
(Reis & D’Incao: 2000)
• After the 1st  regulation,  feedback by fish comm, then recollection of  data
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through collaboration for new strategy (Reis & D’Incao: 2002)
• One third of the fishermen participated at least in 1 meeting, good perception
of Forum efforts, but far meeting point and time-money consuming, in fishing
hours→ not helping the participation level (Kalikoski et al:2010)
• Forum at first  supported by Fisheries Pastoral  And fisheries Colonies,  then
IBAMA and Ngos ecc ecc (Kalikoski et al :2004)
• Collaboration in new calendar and use of ITK (Kalikoski et al :2004)
• Although  some  priorities  have  been  addressed,  no  new  regulation  for
industrial sector and enforcement for their illegal activities (Kalikoski et al :
2004)  →  Little  help  by  external  institutions  (in  particular  government)
(Kalikoski et al:2010)
• Constraint:  most  fish  organization  leaders  are  middlemen  or  politicians
(Kalikoski et al :2004)
Existing Conflicts after the application of CBM
Coron Island
(PH)
• Overlapping laws over resource management and areas with other national
laws:  1995  Mining  Law,  1975  Revised  Forestry  Code  for  resource  use  in
protected  areas,  moreover  illegal  actions  by  logging  and  mining  industries
(Capistrano &Charles: 2012)
• Since 2004 the Coron municipality has decided to make tourism a priority:
destination for financial aid, airport in 2007 supported by JICA, land purchases
by tourism elite, scuba diving and focus on ecotourism (Fabinyi: 2010)
• Internal problem of transparency between community leaders and members
(Mayo-Anda et al: 2006)
• Government  (formed  by  mostly  migrants  and  tourism-inclined)  do  not
recognized the exclusivity of the Tagbanua (Mangahas:2010)
Gili Indah 
(IN)
• Gili Indah named as MPA in 1993 due to rich biodiversity (Afifi: 2011)
• Centralized  policy  due  to  the  Marine  Touristic  Park  in  1993  with  areas
overlapping Gili Indah CBM; the park signed a newly created state property
right→ where government has to provide monitoring and enforcing → unclear
division of the tasks. (Satria et al: 2006) no consensus issue for community
approval of Park initiative; coalition between government and Tes group (since
common aims) (Satria et al: 2004)
• Internal crisis of legitimacy: Awig-Awig is biased towards tourism; reduction of
fishing grounds without alternative; paid enforcement system which is against
the principle of CBM (since Te includes also local police); heavy intervention of
central  government  (against  the  decentralization  law);  conflict  for  the
prohibition of muroami fishing (Satria et al: 2006, Satria et al: 2004)
• Difficulties  in  enforcing  law  against  blast  fishing,  since  it  is  a  practice
commonly  spread  and  accepted,  and  against  muroami,  since  still  largely
practiced;  MFSO  issue  the  muroami  licences,  while  KSDA  prohibits  the
practice for coral reef protection (Satria et al: 2004-2006)
Patos 
Lagoon (BR)
• coastal  areas  in  Brazil  falls  under  different  regime  types  but  fisheries  are
regulated by open access by Constitution (Reis &D’Incao: 2000) (Kalikoski et
al: 2002)
• Unclear  regulation of  FPL  for  definition of  community,  leader,  and  groups
represented in the Forum; due to the location and timing low participation by
the fishermen class; bad communication of meeting time and place as well as
agendas (Reis & D’Incao:2000) 
• IBAMA is the agency which should provide enforcement but scarce services
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provided  for  outsiders  fishers:  the  monitoring  and  enforcing  should  be
decentralized as well (no HR and structures)(Reis & D’Incao:2000) 
• Fisheries  are  managed  by  2  different  governmental  agencies:  IBAMA  and
Department  of  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture,  with  different  policies  and
approach (Kalikoski et al: 2002) 
• Fishermen non compliance with the rules imposed by IBAMA in top-down
approach (Reis &D’Incao: 2000)
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